The following is an assigned essay which was completed for a grade. Unfortunately, some formatting has been lost in the transition to LJ.
Eric J. Herboso
18 September, 2003
Capital, Volume One: “Production of Relative Surplus Value”
In Karl Marx’s Capital, Volume One, Marx explores many different ideas, all of which argue against one basic concept: capitalism. In Part VI, Chapter XV, Section 3 of the text, Marx talks of what he terms as “Production of Relative Surplus-Value”, which can be loosely described as that principle effect of the development of machinery upon workers – in other words, exploitation. His argument is basically a response to Mill, of whom tacitly assumes in his “Principles of Political Economy” that the goal of mechanical inventions is to lighten the workload of society in general. Marx says that the goal is not as not Mill would purport, but rather to increase production. By the emergence of machinery, what used to require hard labor can now be done by workers with less strength and endurance, and thus the door opens for women and children to work whereas only men worked before. This additional workforce may be more expensive to hire and pay for initially, but the relative increase in production is a far higher gain than the loss accrued in the extra cost.
Furthermore, this mechanical “revolution” has become the “most powerful means…for lengthening the working-day beyond all bounds set by human nature” (Marx 404). This seeming paradox is an idea that, according to Marx, even the ancients knew nothing about. He says of them: “to preach slavery of the masses, in order that a few crude and half-educated parvenus, might become ‘eminent spinners,’ ‘extensive sausage-makers,’ and ‘influential shoe-back dealers,’ to do this, they lacked the bump [referencing the pseudo-science of phrenology] of Christianity” (407).
Marx makes a very compelling argument of capitalism using the emergence of technology to further “enslave” mankind. It will be very interesting to see what else he says in Capital.
Tucker, Robert C. Capital, Volume One, The Marx-Engels Reader. Au. Karl Marx.
W. W. Norton & Company.: New York/London, 1978
18 September, 2003
11 September, 2003
On The Jewish Question: But What Exactly Is The Jewish Question?
The following is an assigned essay which was completed for a grade. Unfortunately, some formatting has been lost in the transition to LJ.
Eric J. Herboso
11 September, 2003
On The Jewish Question: But What Exactly Is The Jewish Question?
In Karl Marx’s essay entitled On The Jewish Question, Marx explores the question of how to emancipate the Jew. But he doesn’t accept the idea that for the Jew to have religious freedom in a Christian state is true emancipation, since having that religion legally established by the state would not allow the emancipation to be of a “true” kind. Nor does he accept that the Jew may be politically emancipated, since no one in Germany is politically free. (Why this is so is not made clear by Marx, though Marx probably presupposed that anyone reading his essay would at least understand the state of the state at the time.) In fact, Marx refuses to admit of any kind of emancipation as truly being free, unlike the person to whom he is responding, Bruno Bauer (Die Judenfrage, “Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen frei zu werden”).
So what exactly is it that the Jewish question of emancipation is in regard to? Marx restates Bauer’s idea that religious opposition is made impossible by “abolishing religion” (Marx 28). Marx’s wording isn’t always quite clear (probably due to the translation from German), but what is clear is the idea that “the state which presupposes religion is not yet a true or actual state” (29). Therefore, the Jewish question becomes: “what kind of emancipation is involved” (30)? Having reached the appropriate question, however, still has yet to resolve the answer. Marx continues on, attempting to determine how to answer this “Die Judenfrage”.
Marx denies the idea of political emancipation being anything more than a tool with which to ultimately give individual emancipation. He says that “[i]t is not…the final form of human emancipation, but it is the final form…within the framework of the…social order” (35). He even shows why this is so: “it is because [the Jew] can be emancipated politically, without renouncing Judaism completely and absolutely, that political emancipation itself is not human emancipation.” It would help if Marx defined some of his terms a bit better, but the logic here is good enough to show the main distinction between that of Marx’s “species-life” and “species-being”. The existence of the “species-being” requires that “the privilege of faith is a universal right of man” (41). Unfortunately, this distinction becomes much more blurry when Marx quotes the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen on liberty, security, and property. Is Marx saying that a “species-being” requires these rights in order to exist? One would think so, especially when Marx observes that the rights of man should always come before the state: “the citizen is declared to be the servant of egoistic ‘man’ ” (43); this observation is most obvious in Marx’s criticism of the Constitution of 1793, which states that “ ‘the freedom of the Press should not be permitted when it endangers public liberty’ ” (44): since we are giving the public liberty in order to achieve individual liberty (apart from the state, or citizen, or species-life, depending upon your choice of jargon), then that same individual liberty (of which freedom of the press is a part) must trump over the public liberty whenever they happen to clash. But does Marx say that the constitution should be better worded? On this, he is unclear; he calls the situation an optical illusion and a problem, but in what way exactly is it an illusion?
But despite the ambiguity here, Marx makes it clear that political emancipation is not the emancipation that the Jewish question is asking about. Rather, it must be human emancipation. At least, that’s what Marx seems to be saying. But then he goes into section two.
Marx begins the second section with quoting Bauer’s views on the very capacity of Jews to be free. But Marx does not stop with Bauer’s ideas of the Jew requiring Christianity in order to be truly free; no, rather he goes on to talk about the so-called “real Jew”, of whose religion is supposedly nothing more than that of money itself.
It need not be said that this view is either totally and completely wrong, or else the Jew of the German world must be completely and utterly different from the Jew of today. But despite this, Marx goes on to say things that seem to make little to no sense at all, and the reason for these statements to be included in his argument is equally unclear:
• “The Jews have emancipated themselves in so far as the Christians have become Jews” (49). Is he saying that Christians have become more interested in money? If so, what does this have to do with Jews at all?
• “The monotheism of the Jews is…, in reality, a polytheism of the numerous needs of man…. The god of practical need and self-interest is money” (50). Is Marx seriously saying that the God of the Jews is money? Literally?
• “Judaism attains its apogee with the perfection of civil society; but civil society only reaches perfection in the Christian world” (51). One wonders as to whether this quote of Marx’s should even be commented upon or not.
But truly, the most strange statement of all is that of Marx’s concluding sentence: “The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism” (52). What Marx is saying right here may be construed from his earlier stated sentiments, but the logical conclusion of this point is still very far from clear.
Tucker, Robert C. “On The Jewish Question”, The Marx-Engels Reader. Au. Karl Marx.
W. W. Norton & Company.: New York/London, 1978
Eric J. Herboso
11 September, 2003
On The Jewish Question: But What Exactly Is The Jewish Question?
In Karl Marx’s essay entitled On The Jewish Question, Marx explores the question of how to emancipate the Jew. But he doesn’t accept the idea that for the Jew to have religious freedom in a Christian state is true emancipation, since having that religion legally established by the state would not allow the emancipation to be of a “true” kind. Nor does he accept that the Jew may be politically emancipated, since no one in Germany is politically free. (Why this is so is not made clear by Marx, though Marx probably presupposed that anyone reading his essay would at least understand the state of the state at the time.) In fact, Marx refuses to admit of any kind of emancipation as truly being free, unlike the person to whom he is responding, Bruno Bauer (Die Judenfrage, “Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen frei zu werden”).
So what exactly is it that the Jewish question of emancipation is in regard to? Marx restates Bauer’s idea that religious opposition is made impossible by “abolishing religion” (Marx 28). Marx’s wording isn’t always quite clear (probably due to the translation from German), but what is clear is the idea that “the state which presupposes religion is not yet a true or actual state” (29). Therefore, the Jewish question becomes: “what kind of emancipation is involved” (30)? Having reached the appropriate question, however, still has yet to resolve the answer. Marx continues on, attempting to determine how to answer this “Die Judenfrage”.
Marx denies the idea of political emancipation being anything more than a tool with which to ultimately give individual emancipation. He says that “[i]t is not…the final form of human emancipation, but it is the final form…within the framework of the…social order” (35). He even shows why this is so: “it is because [the Jew] can be emancipated politically, without renouncing Judaism completely and absolutely, that political emancipation itself is not human emancipation.” It would help if Marx defined some of his terms a bit better, but the logic here is good enough to show the main distinction between that of Marx’s “species-life” and “species-being”. The existence of the “species-being” requires that “the privilege of faith is a universal right of man” (41). Unfortunately, this distinction becomes much more blurry when Marx quotes the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen on liberty, security, and property. Is Marx saying that a “species-being” requires these rights in order to exist? One would think so, especially when Marx observes that the rights of man should always come before the state: “the citizen is declared to be the servant of egoistic ‘man’ ” (43); this observation is most obvious in Marx’s criticism of the Constitution of 1793, which states that “ ‘the freedom of the Press should not be permitted when it endangers public liberty’ ” (44): since we are giving the public liberty in order to achieve individual liberty (apart from the state, or citizen, or species-life, depending upon your choice of jargon), then that same individual liberty (of which freedom of the press is a part) must trump over the public liberty whenever they happen to clash. But does Marx say that the constitution should be better worded? On this, he is unclear; he calls the situation an optical illusion and a problem, but in what way exactly is it an illusion?
But despite the ambiguity here, Marx makes it clear that political emancipation is not the emancipation that the Jewish question is asking about. Rather, it must be human emancipation. At least, that’s what Marx seems to be saying. But then he goes into section two.
Marx begins the second section with quoting Bauer’s views on the very capacity of Jews to be free. But Marx does not stop with Bauer’s ideas of the Jew requiring Christianity in order to be truly free; no, rather he goes on to talk about the so-called “real Jew”, of whose religion is supposedly nothing more than that of money itself.
It need not be said that this view is either totally and completely wrong, or else the Jew of the German world must be completely and utterly different from the Jew of today. But despite this, Marx goes on to say things that seem to make little to no sense at all, and the reason for these statements to be included in his argument is equally unclear:
• “The Jews have emancipated themselves in so far as the Christians have become Jews” (49). Is he saying that Christians have become more interested in money? If so, what does this have to do with Jews at all?
• “The monotheism of the Jews is…, in reality, a polytheism of the numerous needs of man…. The god of practical need and self-interest is money” (50). Is Marx seriously saying that the God of the Jews is money? Literally?
• “Judaism attains its apogee with the perfection of civil society; but civil society only reaches perfection in the Christian world” (51). One wonders as to whether this quote of Marx’s should even be commented upon or not.
But truly, the most strange statement of all is that of Marx’s concluding sentence: “The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism” (52). What Marx is saying right here may be construed from his earlier stated sentiments, but the logical conclusion of this point is still very far from clear.
Tucker, Robert C. “On The Jewish Question”, The Marx-Engels Reader. Au. Karl Marx.
W. W. Norton & Company.: New York/London, 1978
02 September, 2003
On Liberty: Chapter III: “Of Individuality”
The following is an assigned essay which was completed for a grade. Unfortunately, some formatting has been lost in the transition to LJ.
Eric J. Herboso
02 September, 2003
On Liberty: Chapter III: “Of Individuality”
In Chapter III of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, Mill argues that the individual actions of human beings should be considered one of the “elements of well-being” (53), assuming, of course, the limitation of disallowing hindrance upon other individuals. His main argument here rests upon the grounds that liberty of action is a necessary requirement for development, and that “it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces…well-developed human beings” (61). Thereby, any proponent of development must necessarily also promote individuality. This follows from the idea that it is only through a good mix of ideas, influences, and (especially) actions that any new ideas may be sought; for if stagnation is the rule, then development is completely impossible.
Having said this, he attempts to go on to argue against those who would still be against individuality and yet admit “that originality is a valuable element in human affairs” (61). (He ignores, of course, those who would argue that the world is already perfect, assuming that such people do not exist.) However, the remainder of this chapter at least fails in this attempt. Though he says that he plans “to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they might be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance”, he finishes the remainder of the chapter without accomplishing this goal. Instead, he continues the argument that the presence of liberty of action in a society helps that society to improve itself developmentally. While Mill’s argument is indeed strong, it remains weak enough to be resisted by those who either care little for progress or those who view liberty of action as inherently negative, regardless of it being a necessary requirement for progress.
However, this minor point aside, it is likely that Mill’s argument for liberty will be accepted by a great majority of the people. However, Mill takes this argument to the very extreme, seemingly daring the reader to respond negatively against it. (A justification for this view can be made from Mill’s earlier statement in Chapter II: “Strange it is that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but to object to their being ‘pushed to an extreme,’ not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case” (20, emphasis added).) Mill talks of government by the one or few as more conducive to freedom than by the masses themselves, and on the ‘good’ being best achieved by “the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought” (64). Mill even goes so far as to almost jokingly call into question the idea of public education, saying that it causes an assimilation of the masses’ thoughts and actions to such a high degree that it may well be a hindrance to progress itself.
However, Mill takes this game of extremities a bit too far when he reaches to China as an example of a state without advances or progress of any kind. In Mill’s day, this euro-centric viewpoint was very much accepted, but any competent arguer would now stay far away from such generalities, even if it turns out to be a valid criticism of that culture.
It will be interesting to see how Mill’s overall argument will continue in the remainder of On Liberty. So far, he has been very persuasive – though, like most arguments, there still remains a limited number of gaps in the logic which preclude a definitive understanding of the topic of Liberty. It remains to be seen if these gaps will be filled in by the end of his essay.
Rapaport, Elizabeth. “On Liberty”. Au. John Stuart Mill.
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1978
Eric J. Herboso
02 September, 2003
On Liberty: Chapter III: “Of Individuality”
In Chapter III of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, Mill argues that the individual actions of human beings should be considered one of the “elements of well-being” (53), assuming, of course, the limitation of disallowing hindrance upon other individuals. His main argument here rests upon the grounds that liberty of action is a necessary requirement for development, and that “it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces…well-developed human beings” (61). Thereby, any proponent of development must necessarily also promote individuality. This follows from the idea that it is only through a good mix of ideas, influences, and (especially) actions that any new ideas may be sought; for if stagnation is the rule, then development is completely impossible.
Having said this, he attempts to go on to argue against those who would still be against individuality and yet admit “that originality is a valuable element in human affairs” (61). (He ignores, of course, those who would argue that the world is already perfect, assuming that such people do not exist.) However, the remainder of this chapter at least fails in this attempt. Though he says that he plans “to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they might be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance”, he finishes the remainder of the chapter without accomplishing this goal. Instead, he continues the argument that the presence of liberty of action in a society helps that society to improve itself developmentally. While Mill’s argument is indeed strong, it remains weak enough to be resisted by those who either care little for progress or those who view liberty of action as inherently negative, regardless of it being a necessary requirement for progress.
However, this minor point aside, it is likely that Mill’s argument for liberty will be accepted by a great majority of the people. However, Mill takes this argument to the very extreme, seemingly daring the reader to respond negatively against it. (A justification for this view can be made from Mill’s earlier statement in Chapter II: “Strange it is that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but to object to their being ‘pushed to an extreme,’ not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case” (20, emphasis added).) Mill talks of government by the one or few as more conducive to freedom than by the masses themselves, and on the ‘good’ being best achieved by “the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought” (64). Mill even goes so far as to almost jokingly call into question the idea of public education, saying that it causes an assimilation of the masses’ thoughts and actions to such a high degree that it may well be a hindrance to progress itself.
However, Mill takes this game of extremities a bit too far when he reaches to China as an example of a state without advances or progress of any kind. In Mill’s day, this euro-centric viewpoint was very much accepted, but any competent arguer would now stay far away from such generalities, even if it turns out to be a valid criticism of that culture.
It will be interesting to see how Mill’s overall argument will continue in the remainder of On Liberty. So far, he has been very persuasive – though, like most arguments, there still remains a limited number of gaps in the logic which preclude a definitive understanding of the topic of Liberty. It remains to be seen if these gaps will be filled in by the end of his essay.
Rapaport, Elizabeth. “On Liberty”. Au. John Stuart Mill.
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1978
09 July, 2003
A Wonderful Place To Be
Originally posted in my RAE journal.
It has started.
Today, on Wednesday, July 9, 2003, Robin told me that she trusts me. I am, to be quite honest, ecstatic.
It was barely five days ago on Independence Day that we first decided on a date and location: we will be married on Sunday, the twelfth of December, 2004, in Disney World itself. (c;
My joy, it seems, is overwhelming. And Robin's is as well.
What will the future bring, I wonder? Whatever it may be, I can be sure of one thing at least now: It will be a wonderful place to be.
-EjH
It has started.
Today, on Wednesday, July 9, 2003, Robin told me that she trusts me. I am, to be quite honest, ecstatic.
It was barely five days ago on Independence Day that we first decided on a date and location: we will be married on Sunday, the twelfth of December, 2004, in Disney World itself. (c;
My joy, it seems, is overwhelming. And Robin's is as well.
What will the future bring, I wonder? Whatever it may be, I can be sure of one thing at least now: It will be a wonderful place to be.
-EjH
19 June, 2003
Dino Hunting!
[As originally posted on the MTGN forums at "http://forums.mtgnews.com/showpost.php?p=1642424&postcount=439".]
For nearly two weeks, from June fifth to June eighteenth, I experienced a trip very unlike anything that I'd ever enountered before.
I went dinosaur hunting.
I had never before done anything truly paleontological, though when I was younger I did do a short archaeological stunt in Pensacola, FL, where in the course of building a new highway, they inadvertently dug up an old spanish fort site as well. But that was just kids' stuff; nothing fancy, and nothing major.
But dino hunting? Now this was major hardcore stuff.
Pleasantly, I packed my bags, looking forward to what I thought would be the vacation of a lifetime. This was the real deal: true field work experience, albeit in a field somewhat divergent from my theoretical physics and fundamental mathematical background. To think of it! Actual unadulterated field experience! It was an experience beyond what I had ever accomplished before.
I mean, I've published in a national magazine. I've had a few poems printed in amateur poetry books. I even had done a little prep work for an old professor's then unpublished findings (though my name was not put on the published material, since I had not contributed much to the experimental findings). But I'd never before done anything truly intellectual, that I might be published on, or even that might further the advance of science itself. Instead, all I had done are things that I cannot help but to view as second tier: bland advertisement, perfunctory immature poetry, and 'rip-offs' that deserve no better than a cursory glance by any intelligent reader.
But this... This was the chance of a lifetime. To think of all those preadolescent days when I dreamed of going into xenomacropaleontology (don't ask), and to realize as to just how few people actually get to accomplish those dreams held to them as a child...
Alas! Dreams, like shadows and heroes, diminish the closer one appears.
This is not to say that all dreams are bad in any sense more than shadows or heroes might be considered bad. But it does, in some senses, remain quite true. (Of course, this leads into the argument that any categorical distinction is as true as it is untrue; whereas the ends do not justify the means, you also can't make an omellete without breaking a few eggs.) And in that sense, at least, I found out a great lesson in my dino hunting trip. A great lesson indeed.
Inasmuch as my enjoyment went, I had an absolutely glorious time. I found a triceratops (my personal favorite dinosaur, due to a mid-eighties trike craze I experienced in my childhood), minus the skull and limbs, but with at least one intact vertebra and multiple ribs and tendons. The specimen was not articulate, unfortunately, but the spread of the bones did indicate that it had been killed by a neotyrannosaur, and later scavenged by some form of cretaceous raptor that we couldn't identify. Teeth marks were found on the bone, but no teeth were imbedded within the bone itself. All in all, it was a fairly average find, with nothing of particular scientific interest. But to me, it was wonderful. Exhilirating. Delightful. Enjoyable.
But there remained that voice in the back of my head, understanding what was to become of these bones after they were fully prepped. They would be sold, I came to understand, and the profits would remain with Dr. Garstka, the paleontologist of the group.
But then again, he wasn't really a paleontologist. And there, I think, is where it all came out wrong.
Bill, you see, had his training in biology, specifically in snakes and lizards. Of course, his education came from the Vietnam era, so the biology he learned is now horrendously outdated, though he still works his day job teaching the stuff at a mid-sized 'government' (his description) university. He used to do research on specimens, but when the animal rights activists got a whole bunch of government regulations on cage size, feeding habits, and the like, he found that he was unable to cope with any of it, and switched over to field work in a national preserve instead.
The preserve at that time was headed by a country boy, very unlike today's common park ranger head honchos who come from more of a law enforcement background. Accordingly, Bill was allowed considerable leeway in his field experiments; this all changed once the leadership changed, and suddenly Bill found himself unable to conduct useful research without first leaving the country.
It was at this point that he turned to paleontology. "Surely," said he, "there will be no such restrictions on animals that have been dead for sixty-five million years!"
But, as he isn't a paleontologist by training, his research could not be funded by the university he was employed at, and instead he got his funding through the selling of dinosaur bones to the general public.
Now, I don't want to go into all that this means, though I'm sure most of my readers can glean exactly what a pothole of philosophical questions this opens up, especially in the field of a historical science like paleontology. Remember: once it's dug out, it can never be dug out again. And once it's sold to the general public, it would take a hell of a time to get it back into a museum in even the worst of conditions.
As a historical example, allow me to cite the old westerns that Hollywood did back in the day. Remember all of those headresses and teepees and stuff they used as props? Those were all real. They went out into the poor parts of native american land and bought out all of the old stuff, merely to be used as props in movies. Because of that, there are no old headresses anymore. They were all destroyed and thrown away by old movie actors who ruined them. Nowadays, all there is access to is fifty year old and younger artifacts from Native American land, excepting what is found in archaeological dig sites.
So it bothered me somewhat when I came to find out that Bill funded his bone-digging by selling his bones. It turned a scientific escapade into a lesson in marketing. I could see no difference between digging up these bones and selling them at inflated prices than I see in the raping of the earth for natural resources like oil and gold, and selling them for a profit as well. Hell, I can even see an argument for why oil must be drilled for and sold, whereas there is absolutely no reason why dinosaur bones should be sold to the public, especially at the loss of museum pieces that is sustained because of it.
Do you realize that there have only been twenty-eight complete Tyrannosaurus Rex skeletons dug up in the entire history of paleontology, and, of these, only half of them are in actual museums? And only one of the articulate ones is in a museum, where it rightly belongs! And for that matter, most museums have mere plasters of skeletons, and few actual bones to speak of. All because of money-grubbing entrepeneural 'pseudo-paleontologists', who pervert the science of paleontology into mere profiteering.
As you can see, my comfort level of working with Dr. Bill Garstka dropped tremendously almost from the very beginning.
But I tried not to let it get to me. I tried not to think about what would happen after the entire process of prepping the bones had been finished. Instead, I concentrated on the thrill of finding a Trike vertebra in the flaky North Dakota rock, and of the beauty unraveled before me as I swept the dust away with a paintbrush.
Truly, it was an amazing adventure for me, despite all of the conceptual problems I had with the whole situation.
But, I suppose my disagreement with the situation became quite apparent with Bill. I kept noticing the local scientist types bothering him, circling planes above him with the intention of pure annoyance, and driving up to a far-off butte, sitting and watching as Bill dug into the rock below. I realized: they had no way of stopping Bill from doing what he was doing in any legal manner whatsoever, and yet the cared enough for the sanctity of pure, profitless science that they took time away from their day specifically in order to try and intimidate him from digging there.
But truly, what could they do? What can they do? They talk with the local ranchers, trying to persuade them to not lease out the dinosaur digging rights to anyone other than a university, but there aren't enough universities sponsoring such digs, and besides: profiteers like Bill give huge handouts monetarily in order to keep their leases current. And how can you ever convince a rancher not to take huge sums of money that is offered to him, even if it is in the name of science to turn profiteers down?
I read B. F. Skinner's Walden II while I was there. It turned out to be a most appropriate book to be reading for the occasion.
I had planned on staying there longer. But, after nearly two weeks, I was asked to leave. Not just because of my views, but for a number of other things. Bill, ironically enough, was just too damned objectivist for me.
But irregardless (i.e., with regard) of my misgivings after the fact, I still think that this trip of mine, above all other trips, has been the one where I not only learned the most, but also got the most experience, and best of all, became cognizant of certain ideas and thoughts that I hadn't fully understood before now...
All in all, I had a most rewarding trip, and I am very, very glad that I took it.
PS:
If you haven't read Skinner's Walden II, go read it. Now. I'm serious. I picked it up on accident, thinking it was Thoreau's Walden, and I'm glad I did. What a find!
Read it.
For nearly two weeks, from June fifth to June eighteenth, I experienced a trip very unlike anything that I'd ever enountered before.
I went dinosaur hunting.
I had never before done anything truly paleontological, though when I was younger I did do a short archaeological stunt in Pensacola, FL, where in the course of building a new highway, they inadvertently dug up an old spanish fort site as well. But that was just kids' stuff; nothing fancy, and nothing major.
But dino hunting? Now this was major hardcore stuff.
Pleasantly, I packed my bags, looking forward to what I thought would be the vacation of a lifetime. This was the real deal: true field work experience, albeit in a field somewhat divergent from my theoretical physics and fundamental mathematical background. To think of it! Actual unadulterated field experience! It was an experience beyond what I had ever accomplished before.
I mean, I've published in a national magazine. I've had a few poems printed in amateur poetry books. I even had done a little prep work for an old professor's then unpublished findings (though my name was not put on the published material, since I had not contributed much to the experimental findings). But I'd never before done anything truly intellectual, that I might be published on, or even that might further the advance of science itself. Instead, all I had done are things that I cannot help but to view as second tier: bland advertisement, perfunctory immature poetry, and 'rip-offs' that deserve no better than a cursory glance by any intelligent reader.
But this... This was the chance of a lifetime. To think of all those preadolescent days when I dreamed of going into xenomacropaleontology (don't ask), and to realize as to just how few people actually get to accomplish those dreams held to them as a child...
Alas! Dreams, like shadows and heroes, diminish the closer one appears.
This is not to say that all dreams are bad in any sense more than shadows or heroes might be considered bad. But it does, in some senses, remain quite true. (Of course, this leads into the argument that any categorical distinction is as true as it is untrue; whereas the ends do not justify the means, you also can't make an omellete without breaking a few eggs.) And in that sense, at least, I found out a great lesson in my dino hunting trip. A great lesson indeed.
Inasmuch as my enjoyment went, I had an absolutely glorious time. I found a triceratops (my personal favorite dinosaur, due to a mid-eighties trike craze I experienced in my childhood), minus the skull and limbs, but with at least one intact vertebra and multiple ribs and tendons. The specimen was not articulate, unfortunately, but the spread of the bones did indicate that it had been killed by a neotyrannosaur, and later scavenged by some form of cretaceous raptor that we couldn't identify. Teeth marks were found on the bone, but no teeth were imbedded within the bone itself. All in all, it was a fairly average find, with nothing of particular scientific interest. But to me, it was wonderful. Exhilirating. Delightful. Enjoyable.
But there remained that voice in the back of my head, understanding what was to become of these bones after they were fully prepped. They would be sold, I came to understand, and the profits would remain with Dr. Garstka, the paleontologist of the group.
But then again, he wasn't really a paleontologist. And there, I think, is where it all came out wrong.
Bill, you see, had his training in biology, specifically in snakes and lizards. Of course, his education came from the Vietnam era, so the biology he learned is now horrendously outdated, though he still works his day job teaching the stuff at a mid-sized 'government' (his description) university. He used to do research on specimens, but when the animal rights activists got a whole bunch of government regulations on cage size, feeding habits, and the like, he found that he was unable to cope with any of it, and switched over to field work in a national preserve instead.
The preserve at that time was headed by a country boy, very unlike today's common park ranger head honchos who come from more of a law enforcement background. Accordingly, Bill was allowed considerable leeway in his field experiments; this all changed once the leadership changed, and suddenly Bill found himself unable to conduct useful research without first leaving the country.
It was at this point that he turned to paleontology. "Surely," said he, "there will be no such restrictions on animals that have been dead for sixty-five million years!"
But, as he isn't a paleontologist by training, his research could not be funded by the university he was employed at, and instead he got his funding through the selling of dinosaur bones to the general public.
Now, I don't want to go into all that this means, though I'm sure most of my readers can glean exactly what a pothole of philosophical questions this opens up, especially in the field of a historical science like paleontology. Remember: once it's dug out, it can never be dug out again. And once it's sold to the general public, it would take a hell of a time to get it back into a museum in even the worst of conditions.
As a historical example, allow me to cite the old westerns that Hollywood did back in the day. Remember all of those headresses and teepees and stuff they used as props? Those were all real. They went out into the poor parts of native american land and bought out all of the old stuff, merely to be used as props in movies. Because of that, there are no old headresses anymore. They were all destroyed and thrown away by old movie actors who ruined them. Nowadays, all there is access to is fifty year old and younger artifacts from Native American land, excepting what is found in archaeological dig sites.
So it bothered me somewhat when I came to find out that Bill funded his bone-digging by selling his bones. It turned a scientific escapade into a lesson in marketing. I could see no difference between digging up these bones and selling them at inflated prices than I see in the raping of the earth for natural resources like oil and gold, and selling them for a profit as well. Hell, I can even see an argument for why oil must be drilled for and sold, whereas there is absolutely no reason why dinosaur bones should be sold to the public, especially at the loss of museum pieces that is sustained because of it.
Do you realize that there have only been twenty-eight complete Tyrannosaurus Rex skeletons dug up in the entire history of paleontology, and, of these, only half of them are in actual museums? And only one of the articulate ones is in a museum, where it rightly belongs! And for that matter, most museums have mere plasters of skeletons, and few actual bones to speak of. All because of money-grubbing entrepeneural 'pseudo-paleontologists', who pervert the science of paleontology into mere profiteering.
As you can see, my comfort level of working with Dr. Bill Garstka dropped tremendously almost from the very beginning.
But I tried not to let it get to me. I tried not to think about what would happen after the entire process of prepping the bones had been finished. Instead, I concentrated on the thrill of finding a Trike vertebra in the flaky North Dakota rock, and of the beauty unraveled before me as I swept the dust away with a paintbrush.
Truly, it was an amazing adventure for me, despite all of the conceptual problems I had with the whole situation.
But, I suppose my disagreement with the situation became quite apparent with Bill. I kept noticing the local scientist types bothering him, circling planes above him with the intention of pure annoyance, and driving up to a far-off butte, sitting and watching as Bill dug into the rock below. I realized: they had no way of stopping Bill from doing what he was doing in any legal manner whatsoever, and yet the cared enough for the sanctity of pure, profitless science that they took time away from their day specifically in order to try and intimidate him from digging there.
But truly, what could they do? What can they do? They talk with the local ranchers, trying to persuade them to not lease out the dinosaur digging rights to anyone other than a university, but there aren't enough universities sponsoring such digs, and besides: profiteers like Bill give huge handouts monetarily in order to keep their leases current. And how can you ever convince a rancher not to take huge sums of money that is offered to him, even if it is in the name of science to turn profiteers down?
I read B. F. Skinner's Walden II while I was there. It turned out to be a most appropriate book to be reading for the occasion.
I had planned on staying there longer. But, after nearly two weeks, I was asked to leave. Not just because of my views, but for a number of other things. Bill, ironically enough, was just too damned objectivist for me.
But irregardless (i.e., with regard) of my misgivings after the fact, I still think that this trip of mine, above all other trips, has been the one where I not only learned the most, but also got the most experience, and best of all, became cognizant of certain ideas and thoughts that I hadn't fully understood before now...
All in all, I had a most rewarding trip, and I am very, very glad that I took it.
PS:
If you haven't read Skinner's Walden II, go read it. Now. I'm serious. I picked it up on accident, thinking it was Thoreau's Walden, and I'm glad I did. What a find!
Read it.
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